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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the redevelopment of the failed Columbia
Point public housing project into Harbor Point, a private
mixed-income project from primarily a financial viewpoint.
The context surrounding Columbia Point's redevelopment is
examined as it relates to the extraordinary degree of public
support and subsidy this project has received.
The complex financial structure which makes this project
feasible is explained, and the level and source of subsidy
is examined. A scenario for the project's financial
performance over time is constructed to see how much money
the special Public Trust Fund might generate, and to gauge
how much profit the developer is likely to earn from this
project.
A review of the analysis suggests that the level of subsidy
this project has attracted is extraordinary, and that the
political imperative to redevelop Columbia Point had a great
influence on the normal development process. Because of
project economics, the public is subsidizing the market-rate
as well as the low-income units. Both the amount of money
the Trust Fund generates and the profit the developer earns
are very sensitive to the project's success as a residential
community. The project depends on its ability to attract
market-rate tenants for this success. To do this it must
overcome the negative reputation of Columbia Point. Although
the Trust mechanism could, under the best conditions,
accumulate enough money to carry the 400 low-income units
for as much as ten to fifteen years, the project will need
to rely on continued public support to maintain these units
for the entire 99-year lease term. It could however
eventually self-subsidize a moderate-income component.
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CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION
Jutting out into Dorchester Bay, on Boston's Columbia
Point Peninsula, sits a banal grouping of orange brick
buildings which together comprise the Columbia Point public
housing project. This project, the last of the very large
public housing projects built in Boston, is being redeveloped
by the private sector into a privately owned and managed
mixed-income housing development named "Harbor Point."
The development's erstwhile patron, the Boston Housing
Authority (BHA), has relinquished its stake in the project
in the hope that once privately redeveloped, the project
will provide safe, decent, well-maintained homes for the
public housing tenants currently living there, something the
BHA has been unable to do. The BHA also hopes, as does the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, the City of
Boston and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, that finally
the onus of the public housing project's failure will be
lifted, and that the stigma which has come to be synonymous
with the name "Columbia Point" will be at last wiped off the
peninsula.
The reason I chose to investigate Columbia Point was
that I was curious about how public goals were reconciled
with the financial exigencies within a real estate development.
I was interested in how the project was tailored to suit its
financing. I soon found, however, that that discussion would
be very brief compared to the one about how the financing
was tailored to suit the project: in the Columbia Point
7case, the project drove the financing, not the other way
around. My other interest was in seeing how the mixed-
income character of the development was worked into the
project's finances, specifically to see if it was possible
to internally subsidize low-income units with the market
rents. That led to the discovery that Harbor Point will not
be able to subsidize itself and that it will rely on a
large array of public subsidies in order to house low-income
families and be financially feasible.
Lewis Spence, the court-appointed administrator (1)
of the BHA said of Columbia Point, "It's an anomaly . . .
It was a Devil's Island of the poor and requires an anomalous
solution." (2) The solution which has evolved for Columbia
Point is certainly anomalous. The singular nature of
Columbia Point radically altered the development process by
causing the emergence of a "political imperative" which was
instrumental in making its redevelopment possible.
The normal development process, in which a developer
locates a site and designs a program determined primarily by
the financing he or she can obtain, and in which market
considerations and the site's characteristics determine the
development's rent structure, was totally restructured by
the nature and strength of the political imperative to
redevelop Columbia Point. For this project the site was
pre-determined, and certain elements of the program (the
inclusion of 400 low-income units) were foregone conclusions.
There was very little flexiblity in changing the program.
Using strict, traditional criteria for public and private
8action, it is not evident why everyone remained committed to
the project. There was something special about the
redevelopment of Columbia Point which kept them there: the
completion of the project was a goal which took on a life of
its own. No one wanted to appear in the Boston Globe as the
party responsible for killing the project.
From a public perspective, the redevelopment will
provide four benefits. First it will provide 400 units of
low-income housing which will be properly managed and
maintained for 30 years. Second it will generate a cash
reserve earmarked for low-income housing. Half of this
reserve will subsidize Harbor Point's 400 low-income units
after the current 30-year commitment expires. The other half
of this reserve will be disbursed yearly to the BHA.
Third, it will pay property taxes to the City (public housing
does not). Finally it will clean up the Peninsula with a
new, socially mixed community. But the amount of public
subsidy required to provide these 400 low-income units,
indeed to carry out the project at all, has risen steadily
during the planning period. Despite this rise, the public
sector has remained committed to providing the resources
required to complete Columbia Point's redevelopment.
From a private perspective, the project is fraught
with difficulty and risk. Developing a project to satisfy
various public bodies requires a high level of sophistication
and is much more complex than an as of right development.
This project in particular demanded an extensive amount of
negotiation with the public sector. The concept of mixed-
9income housing, particularly of mixing high-end market-rate
tenants with former public housing tenants, is an innovation
in the City of Boston. As an untested housing product, the
risk is greater than that for a totally market-rate, or
market-moderate mixed development. Also, from the developer's
perspective, the financial returns will be more difficult to
extract and less certain than those for a comparable housing
development built elsewhere, unburdened by all the political
baggage attendant to Columbia Point.
Given another set of circumstances, the public sector
would have chosen to construct low-income units in a more
cost-effective location. Under ordinary conditions, the
private sector would have balked at a project where the
returns are so circumscribed and uncertain. In redeveloping
Columbia Point, the public and private actors have been
galvanized to complete the project. This commitment has
eclipsed considerations of cost-effectiveness and of
financial return.
The existence of a political imperative to redevelop
Columbia Point evolved from the sense of public purpose
which surrounds this task. This sense exists because of
Columbia Point's sad history, the high visibility of that
history and of efforts to alter its direction, and finally
because the public-to-private transfer is laden with
symbolic value.
Because an overriding sense of public purpose
pervades the Harbor Point project, recasting Columbia Point
into a successful private project is seen as a public good
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with far more public utility than another comparable
development project might have. Because of Columbia Point's
notoriety, whoever finally turns the squalid complex into a
pleasant residential community will have accomplished a task
which is sure to be heralded as bordering on the miraculous.
This fact has doubtlessly not been lost on either the public
or private actors who will be credited with the accomplishment.
Corresponding to this public purpose there is an
extraordinary degree of political support amassed behind the
project. Without this political backing, and the momentum
created by that backing, the redevelopment could never have
been accomplished. This comprehensive political support
has translated into the involvement of all levels of
government, each with a slightly different agenda, and into
a formidable array of subsidies maneuvered into place by
these federal, state and local agencies. While this array
ultimately made the project feasible, it also helped to
complicate the development process tremendously. Four years
passed from the start of the negotiations to the selection
of a developer, and seven years will have passed before
ground is broken. (3)
Columbia Point's history, which is summarized in
the next chapter, created a climate of expectation and
anticipation for its redevelopment. The failure of Columbia
Point is nationally known. The BHA's inability to rectify
it was well covered by the press. A series of outside
redevelopment efforts also fell flat. As development
pressure in Boston has increased, and in particular as the
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market for housing has burdgeoned, the latest plans for this
prime piece of land have become front-page news.
The ramifications of the public-to-private transfer
is another reason for Columbia Point's unique status.
A significant public asset, built and dedicated to house
low-income households and operated by the public sector,
will be shifted to the private market. Luxury market housing
will be built where over 1500 units of low-income public
housing once stood. Only 400 units of low-income housing
will remain, a vestige of the site's past as a public housing
project. The provision of these 400 units is the condition
the public sector has imposed to allow the transfer to
private hands.
While the net loss of over 1100 units of low-income
housing units inspired some housing advocates to oppose a
private redevelopment, this loss is illusory. For the past
seven years, over 1100 of the units at Columbia Point have
been vacant, and the BHA has proven itself incapable of
maintaining either the occupied or vacant units. Although
the reason for this high vacancy level is the BHA's lack of
control over the project, this condition is real and
seemingly irremediable.
Even at a time when the federal government's
involvement in housing production is at a low ebb, when
demand for affordable housing is great, and when local
housing resources are being stretched to the limit, the
Columbia Point redevelopment has managed to attract a
disproportionately high level of public subsidy.
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This thesis examines the redevelopment of Columbia
Point primarily from a financial viewpoint. It investigates
the way in which the special circumstances surrounding
Columbia Point affected the development process; how the
project defined the financial structure, and the array of
public subsidies which was called into play to carry the
project out. In outlining and analyzing the financial
structure of the project, particular attention is paid to
the amount of support pledged by the public sector, and to
the profits which are likely to be made by the private
sector. Aspects of the financial structure unique to
Columbia Point are examined. An operating scenario is
played out over time using a set of assumptions about
project variables in order determine the implications of the
financial structure. The final chapter considers the
project's long-term financial performance in light of the
political imperative surrounding it.
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CHAPTER TWO HISTORY OF COLUMBIA POINT
Columbia Point's history is one of visibility and
neglect, aborted plans and ineffectual initiatives.
This history led to widespread political support for its
redevelopment.
The Columbia Point public housing project was
completed in 1954. It consists of 1504 apartment units in
fifteen 7-story and twelve 3-story buildings. The buildings
are closely grouped on the 38-acre site at a density of
about 40 units per acre. Like many urban public housing
projects built in the early fifties, the living space
allowances per unit are minimal, the site planning and
landscaping rudimentary, and the architecture repetitive and
monotonous. Oblivious to its seaside location, the
development does not relate to the waterfront in any way.
The site was formerly part of the Calf's Pasture municipal
garbage dump, which continued operating until 1962.
With the exception of a pumping station, the Columbia Point
Peninsula was otherwise undeveloped when the project was
built.
Despite its lack of amenity, the Columbia Point project
operated at full occupancy for over a decade. Its isolation
from the adjacent Dorchester neighborhood--often cited as a key
factor in its eventual failure--was considered an asset by many
of its early residents. (4)
Columbia Point is part of Boston's inventory of over
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1. Location of Columbia Point and of Columbia Point Public
Housing Project in Boston.
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18,000 public housing units, of which approximately 16.5% are
vacant. (5) Together with publicly assisted housing, this
public housing inventory comprises roughly 10% of the total
number of dwelling units within the City, making it a
significant housing resource for Boston. (6)
The decade of the 60's saw fundamental changes in
the operation of public housing nationwide. In Boston, as
elsewhere, the rises in housing costs and incomes became
disjointed, making housing less affordable to most consumers
generally. At the same time federal programs such as Urban
Renewal and urban highway building had or were displacing
large numbers of mostly poor, black people from the central
cities. Because the demolition of affordable units far
outpaced their replacement, many displaced households were
relocated into public housing.
Households displaced by federal activity were given
priority status in public housing waiting lists; eventually
the tenant profile of housing authorities in large cities
underwent a complete transformation. The typical household
became black, female-headed, and dependent on public
assistance. The "working poor" largely left the projects to
be replaced by the "chronically poor." As a result, most
local housing authorities began to face enormous financial
and management problems. The basic equation of public
housing had to be reformulated.
The operation of public housing projects was
formerly financed out of each project's rental receipts,
with a federal subsidy required only for the projects'
16
actual development. Now the local housing authorities
required operating subsidies as well, to make up for
diminished rental receipts. In addition, most large
projects in major cities were in need of major infusions of
capital to modernize and rehabilitate. This need arose
partly to remedy the false economies achieved in their
construction, partly to make major repairs deferred due to
lack of resources, and partly because of deterioration
accelerated by vandalism, neglect, and mismanagement.
The Columbia Point project was no exception.
The BHA had developed one of the least impressive reputations
of all public housing authorities in the nation. Under its
(mis)management, Columbia Point did not age gracefully.
In 1966, the BHA began to deliberately assign its "problem
tenants" to the Columbia Point project because of the
availability of social services on-site. (7) By 1971, the
major problem facing Columbia Point was the number of "severely
disruptive" tenants. (8) The project's vacancy level rose
steadily during the 1970's until it reached the present level
of over 75%.
During this time the project acquired and reinforced
its extremely negative, stigmatized image. The largest
public housing project in New England came to be considered
the embodiment of the failure of public housing. Because
Columbia Point grew to resemble the pejorative stereotype of
public housing so accurately, the stigma which settled on
the failed project was strong and pervasive. The delivery
of city services, even those normally considered essential,
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became virtually non-existent. The project's unoccupied
buildings became a convenient refuge in which criminals
could conduct their activities (mostly drug dealing) without
interference from the police. Even the Boston Fire
Department refused to answer calls from the project. (9)
Because of a series of well-publicized redevelopment
plans, a climate of anticipation developed around Columbia
Point. The redevelopment of Columbia Point, an idea bandied
about so frequently, gradually grew into a political
imperative. The abject failure of Columbia Point was an
embarassment to the various governmental entities whose
purview includes housing. The repeated collapses of
redevelopment efforts only served to put the project's
failure in greater relief and reinforce the political
commitment. The interest in its redevelopment which evolved
at all levels of government was instrumental in providing
the resources and official sanctions required for its
completion. In addition, public investment ocurring
elsewhere on the Peninsula (the University of Massachusetts
in 1974, the John F. Kennedy Memorial Library in 1979, and
the state archives facility in 1985) made the presence of an
imposing, boarded-up public housing project increasingly
incongruous.
While all levels of government had an interest in
Columbia Point, each had distinct motives. In the environment
of fiscal austerity which emerged at the federal level during
the Reagan era, HUD was especially reluctant to allocate money
which would be squandered on a hopelessly mismanaged project.
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HUD, dubious of the BHA's ability to operate the project, was
anxious to dispose of it.
The BHA, the manager of the project, is mandated to
provide safe and decent housing to eligible Boston households.
Especially in light of the Perez case, (10) the BHA needed
either to successfully rehabilitate the project or dispose
of it.
The City, represented by its planning and zoning
agency, the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA), had
broader interests such as encouraging and controlling
desirable development throughout the Peninsula, balancing
development throughout the City, encouraging the vitality of
all its neighborhoods, as well as ensuring an adequate
supply of housing. Having backed several redevelopment
proposals for Columbia Point in the past, the City was
anxious to finally deliver on its promises.
The Commonwealth, represented by the Executive
Office of Communities and Development (EOCD), also could not
ignore the implications of New England's largest public
housing project lying in shambles, particularly when it has
expressed a commitment to housing state-wide.
Clearly the failure of Columbia Point, the dimensions
of that failure, and its high profile, have been a longstanding
political liability for many governmental entities.
Even as it was planning the redevelopment of other
housing projects in Boston (such as Franklin Field, "D" Street
in South Boston, and Fidelis Way in Allston), the BHA felt
that it could not successfully redevelop the entire Columbia
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Point project on its own. A belief that so large a
concentration of low-income households on such an isolated
site was doomed to fail, as well as a realistic appraisal of
the likelihood of funding from HUD, led it first to envision
a scaled-down BHA development, adjacent to a private market
development, and eventually to relinquish the entire project
to private hands. (11)
The BRA, the City and even the tenants agreed that
the BHA was not capable of resuscitating Columbia Point as a
public housing project. Acceptance of this premise, while
keeping a commitment to rehouse existing tenants, effectively
forces the conclusion that the redeveloped project must be
mixed-income, and that it be developed, owned and managed by
the private sector.
The impetus to redevelop Columbia Point has existed
almost as long as the project itself. Ed Logue, head of the
BRA, petitioned (unsuccessfully) in 1964 that the Peninsula
be slated as an urban renewal area. When the University of
Massachusetts decided to locate its new campus on the
Peninsula in 1968, it touched off a furor regarding the
impact the institution would have on the existing neighborhood.
The aftermath was the commission of the first in a series of
unrealized plans to redevelop the entire Peninsula.
This plan, called the "$150 Million Proposal" by an
enthusiastic White administration, was announced at about
the same time the University campus actually opened its
doors in 1974.
This plan established the principle of redeveloping
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only as much public housing as needed to rehouse the
households actually living in Columbia Point (about 900
households at this time). (12) This feature would be
included in all future proposals, including the final one.
Because tenant attrition was greatest around this time, as
project conditions deteriorated, the idea of rehousing only
existing tenants was seen by some tenants and tenant
advocates as a deliberate plot to burden the eventual
project, and developer, with the minimum number of low-
income units. Willfully or not, this principle did
essentially determine the number of low-income units finally
included in the project.
A second major initiative was instituted by the
BHA itself, using funds allocated to it under HUD's Target
Projects Program and Modernization Program. The Target
Projects Program was an effort to comprehensively assist
severely distressed projects. The Modernization Program was
a capital improvements program which funded the upgrading of
deteriorated projects. Because of pressure from the court-
appointed master (appointed to oversee the BHA's operation
in 1977 as a result of the Perez class action suit), the BHA
solicited a greater degree of tenant participation for this
improvement effort than usual. A "modernization referendum"
was conducted to obtain tenant input concerning the best use
of the allocated funds. Choosing between spreading the money
over the most units or spending as much as possible on fewer
units, the tenants voted for the latter strategy. While this
surprised the BHA, it makes perfect sense when one considers
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the BHA's capacity to execute and maintain physical
improvements. This attitude on the part of the tenants, of
first and foremost securing the best possible improvements
for their own units, their low regard for the BHA's
capabilities, played a major role in formulating the
eventual development concept.
The BHA's effort succeeded in rehabilitating only
a small fraction of the units. The work which was done by
the low-bidding contractor was of very poor quality,
typifying the BHA's inability make significant and permanent
improvements to the Columbia Point project. (13) The tenant's
choice, rooted in a basic distrust of the BHA's abilities,
was a wise one.
HUD next stepped in to form a task force to tackle
the project's problems. This task force attempted to build
upon what the BHA had done, physically as well as politically,
but could not improve the project without additional
financial commitments from the federal government, commitments
which were not forthcoming.
The Peninsula Planning Committee, a group composed
of members of prominent private institutions and corporations,
then prepared the next redevelopment plan which was integrated
into Mayor White's 1977 Boston Plan. Like so many of the
previous plans for Columbia Point Peninsula, this one never
left the drawing board.
By 1978, there was a regrouping of the actors
involved. Most importantly, the tenants elected their first
truly representative task force, the Columbia Point Community
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Task Force (CPCTF). This group was committed to participating
in the planning and development of the project from which up
to now the tenants had largely been excluded.
With the triad of the BRA, the BHA, and the CPCTF in
place, the planning for the redevelopment began in earnest.
For its part, the CPCTF came up with its own redevelopment
plan. Of the three, CPCTF was the strongest advocate of
private management and ownership, and of the greatest degree
of demolition. (14) Again this reflects the tenants' lack of
faith in the BHA, and of their perception that they would be
better housed by leaving the BHA system.
The BHA applied for funding from the Urban Initiatives
Program to help pay for the redevelopment. The award, which
was granted in 1978, will actually be used for demolition
nearly eight years later, to pave the way for private
redevelopment.
By 1979, the BRA, the BHA and the CPCTF signed the
Peninsula Planning Agreement, which detailed each parties'
role in the negotiations to decide how Columbia Point should
be redeveloped. One early product of these negotiations was
the Rehousing Agreement. This pledged to rehouse all tenants
who were certified as such by the BHA as of April 18, 1981.
The final developer's kit was ready by late 1982.
The consensus required among the BRA, BHA, and CPCTF to
produce this kit was the signal HUD needed to believe that
the project had secured the necessary local backing.
Although HUD took a back seat through much of the planning
for Columbia Point's redevelopment, it nonetheless held a
veto position.
A Memorandum of Understanding on developer selection,
signed by the three parties (as well as the eventual
developers), elaborated the conditions set forth in the
developer's kit, to "underscore the unique public purpose of
(the) redevelopment effort." (15) The most significant
stipulations of the Memorandum are that 400 of the units in
the redeveloped project must be low-income housing in
perpetuity, and that all existing Columbia Point tenants are
guaranteed an appropriately sized unit in the project.
These units must be identical to the market-rate units, and
they must be dispersed evenly throughout the development.
The Memorandum also detailed two trust funds to be
financed out of the project, one to protect the 400 low-
income units in the event of a subsidy shortfall, the other
to be applied to low-income housing City-wide. The rationale
for these funds was that as a result of the redevelopment,
the City would lose 1104 units (from 1504 to 400 units) from
its stock of public housing, and that the City had to be
compensated for this loss.
The deadline for proposal submissions was in late
1982. Although the competition was open to developers
throughout the nation, only three proposals were submitted.
This small number attests to the fact that this was not
perceived by the development community at large as an
attractive development opportunity.
A deadlock developed between the BHA, the BRA and
the CPCTF when they were unable to agree on which proposal
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should be chosen. Whereas the CPCTF and BRA preferred the
Corcoran, Mullins and Jennison (CMJ) proposal, the BHA
favored the Columbia Associates (CA) proposal. Although the
BHA cited the greater financial capacity of the CA team, as
well as the experience of one of their partners, the
National Corporation for Housing Partnerships, (16) it is
apparent that the BHA also wished to prevent the CPCTF from
achieving the partnership status CMJ had promised them.
It is interesting to note that, despite the BHA's avowed
interest in safeguarding the tenants' welfare, the roles of
the BHA and the CPCTF were more those of adversaries than of
allies.
Because of the impasse which resulted from the BHA's
support of the CA proposal, Mayor White appointed a mediator
to resolve the deadlock. The "solution" engineered by the
mediator, and accepted by all the parties, was to create a
composite development team composed of members of both the
CMJ and CA teams. In October of 1983, the developer was
finally designated. Within a year, the team completed
negotiations with the BHA, the BRA, and HUD, and signed a
development agreement specifying the scope of the
redevelopment. The redevelopment of Columbia Point was
finally under way.
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CHAPTER THREE THE DEVELOPMENT CONCEPT
When Mayor White appointed a mediator to settle the
developer selection dispute, that mediator negotiated a
merger of the CMJ and CA teams into today's development
team. This development entity, Peninsula Partners, is a
general partner of the ownership entity, the Harbor Point
Apartments Company. Peninsula Partners is headed by CMJ as
managing general partner. Other partners include Robert J.
Kuehn, Jr., of Housing Associates, the Cruz and Peabody
construction companies, and the South Boston Development
Partnership. The Harbor Points Apartments Company is
composed of Peninsula Partners and the CPCTF as general
partners. In this way the tenants have a major decision-
making role in the development and operation of the project.
The National Corporation for Housing Partnerships, part of
the original CA team, dropped out of the second partnership.
CMJ's involvement extends further as its construction
division, CMJ Construction, is a joint venturer with Peabody
Construction in the Vernon Construction Company, a company
set up to be the general contractor for Harbor Point.
The property will be managed by CMJ's property management
division. In addition, CMJ was the developer of "Phase I"
of the Columbia Point redevelopment, Bayside Mall, a failed
shopping center on the peninsula which was converted into
the Bayside Exposition Center in 1983.
CMJ has considerable experience with mixed-income
projects. In the late seventies it converted America Park,
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a dilapidated public housing project in Lynne, into a
residential community, known as King's Lynne, consisting of
441 units split evenly among low-income, moderate-income and
market rates. In 1982 it completed the redevelopment of a
condemned public housing project in Laurel, Maryland into a
mixed-income development of 520 units. While these projects
invite comparison to Harbor Point, it is a very different
undertaking. Columbia Point is a much larger, more notorious
project, and required a highly visible, complicated,
negotiated development process. The project which emerged
from this process poses much greater risks in development
and operation than an "as of right" development.
Because of Columbia Point's reputation, and because
of the inclusion of 400 units of low-income housing, the
developers faced some special marketing considerations.
Said CMJ president Joe Corcoran of Harbor Point's future
(market-rate) tenants, "We're not kidding ourselves . . .
they're not going to come here for the Great Liberal
Experiment . . . Our idea is to build a better mousetrap." (17)
The ingredients for a "better mousetrap" are a waterfront
location with skyline views, luxury units, a variety of
building and unit types, landscaping, parking, on-site
amenities (tennis courts, swimming pools, etc.), a nearby
subway stop, and proximity to downtown Boston.
One of the consequences of having to build a "better
mousetrap" is that the mousetrap will cost more. Although
the developer indicated that luxury units were being built
because that is what will sell in Boston's housing market, (18)
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it is clear that a high-end development will also help
vanquish lingering associations with the squalid, old
Columbia Point. This satisfies the public sector's desire
to transform Columbia Point completely, and from the
developer's viewpoint, lessens the chances that the project
will fail in the marketplace.
Harbor Point's construction costs are affected by
various other factors as well. Most significantly, because
the site is a land fill of marshland, extensive foundation
work and pilings are required for most structures, even two-
story townhouses. The roads must also be specially
constructed to eliminate excessive settling. It has been
estimated that the unusual site conditions added a premium
of over $10,000 to the cost of each unit. (19) Additional
factors cited by the developer as contributing to high
construction costs are the high building costs in Boston
generally, -the costs associated with all-union labor, the
additional costs attributable to a phased construction
sequence, the need to deal with varied building types, and
impositions made during the design review process. (20, 21)
Certain aspects of the low-income housing component
of the project were negotiated among the BRA, the BHA and
the CPCTF and are part of the development agreement.
The primary element of the development concept is that 400
units of low-income housing must be built. The subsidized
units must be identical in every way to the market-rate
units. They must also be evenly dispersed throughout the
development so that there is no segregation within the
project itself.
Part of the development concept is that the
subsidized tenants will benefit both from luxury units, and
from the fact that their community will no longer be
neglected by the City. The presence of affluent market-rate
tenants will supposedly ensure that the project receives
adequate public services, because the affluent have the
political power to demand them.
The development concept originally included a middle
range of moderate-income units, available to households
with incomes between those of the market units, and those
eligible for the low-income units. It was thought that this
would temper the disparity between the very low-income and
affluent tenants, and "balance out" the community. Because
of project economics, however, the subsidy which was going
to permit these moderate-income units, State Housing
Assistance for Rental Production (SHARP), will actually be
used to subsidize the entire project's income in order to
make it feasible at all.
The project involves partially or completely
demolishing 18 of the existing buildings, leaving 330 units
in rehabilitated 3- and 5-story buildings. A total of 952
new units will be built, in townhouse as well as elevator
building formats. Initially the plan included new stepped
7- and 15-story buildings facing the harbor, and a total of
1402 units, but plans for these buildings were scrapped as
costs mounted. The street pattern of the area will be
reconstructed into a grid arranged diagonally to the water-
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front. All streets will terminate near the waterfront and
"Harbor Point Boulevard" will be laid out from Mt. Vernon
Street to a waterfront park as Harbor Point's "main street."
The elimination of the moderate-income units was the
only significant change made in the program because of
financial considerations. The basic development concept
remained intact, despite the fact that it was increasingly
clear that this concept, conceived as it was free from all
limitations of cost-effectiveness and feasibility, would
exact an inordinantly high price to the public sector for
its goals on Columbia Point.
Mount Vernon Street
2. Site Plan of Columbia Point Public Housing Project.
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CHAPTER FOUR FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
Transforming Columbia Point into Harbor Point is a
very expensive undertaking. Because of high development
costs, the project requires substantial development subsidies.
Since it is necessary to deeply subsidize the 400 low-income
units, and because of the large amount of debt service
required to finance the project, Harbor Point will also
require operating subsidies to maintain feasibility.
The array of development and operating subsidies
provided to meet the project's needs, the collection of
regulatory and legislative actions to facilitate the project
at all political levels, and the orchestration of all of
these attest to the political imperative of Columbia Point.
This imperative's existence is particularly evident given
the interdependent nature of the financing components, and
the cooperation among government agencies at all levels
which was required to make the scheme work.
Because of the special nature of the site, and the
development of luxury-type housing, the construction of
Harbor Point will be costly. The construction costs,
including site improvements and general requirements, will
total $88,000 per unit, or about $65 per square foot.
Total development costs, including all mortgageable items,
amount to almost $130,000 per unit, or about $96 per square
foot (See Appendix B for a complete breakdown of development
costs). These costs are high when one considers that more
typical housing can be developed in Boston for $70,000 to
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$80,000 per unit. (22) The construction costs for the BHA's
public redevelopment the Fidelis Way, Franklin Field and
"D" Street projects was under $70,000 per unit. (23)
To meet these high costs, Harbor Point's development
financing package includes a $121 million mortgage at tax-
exempt rates, two federal grants totalling $20.7 million
structured as "soft" junior mortgages, and a $3 million
capital grant from the Commonwealth. Private financing
consists of a syndication which will provide net proceeds of
approximately $33 million, an initial CMJ equity contribution
of approximately $4 million (the developer's total equity
contribution is considered the sum of the actual developer's
equity and the syndication proceeds), and a private gap loan
to finance cash requirements at closing and cash shortfalls
in the initial years of operation.
The project will also use operating subsidies on
both a project-wide and unit-specific basis. The 400 low-
income units will be subsidized by both federal and state
goverment programs (350 units with Section 8 and 50 units
with Chapter 707). The SHARP commitment awarded by EOCD
will enhance the entire project's income. One financial
arrangement unique to Harbor Point is the provision for a
Trust Fund to be financed out of the repayment of public
subsidies and contingent groundlease payments.
The project's first mortgage is provided by the
Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA) through the
issuance of tax-exempt mortgage revenue bonds. The MHFA
is a self-sustaining agency to finance and promote the
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construction and rehabilitiation of housing throughout
Massachusetts which has been issuing loans since 1970.
By statute at least 25% of the units in MHFA-sponsored
projects must be affordable to moderate-income tenants.
The mortgage commitment was originally made in 1984
for $95 million, but grew to $121 million in 1985 in response
to escalating project costs. These costs escalated when
estimates from subcontractors were significantly over initial
projections. The mortgage rate, determined by the sale of
tax-exempt bonds, is 9.85% and the term is 40 years.
Yearly debt service is $12,730,616. (24) The mortgage is
co-insured by MHFA and the FHA under the federal 221(d)(4)
program. MHFA insures the first 20% of the mortgage and FHA
the remaining 80%. This coinsurance arrangement made
possible a longer Section 8 commitment than would otherwise
have been possible. (25)
According to MHFA guidelines, developers of MHFA-
financed projects are limited in their cash return (cash
flow after debt service) to a dividend equal to 6% of their
initial equity investment. In Harbor Point, this dividend
is subordinated only to the MHFA mortgage.
The mortgage is the largest single commitment in
MHFA's history, by a fair margin. (26) It is doubtful that
the project would have been feasible on the basis of a
market-rate mortgage, which would have had higher monthly
payments because of a higher interest rate and a shorter
term. In addition, the controversial and risky nature of
the project would probably have deterred most Boston banks
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from lending at favorable terms, if at all.
The Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) award was
the fruit of protracted negotiations with HUD. The City
initially received a Phase I award of $4.5 million to help
renovate the Bayside Exposition Center from a 1978
application. The Phase II (Columbia Point housing project)
award languished for several years, during which the UDAG
program was winding down. In 1984, the resubmitted $20
million Phase II request was "rolled over" by HUD. (27)
When the Phase II award of $12 million was finally announced
in 1985, it represented over 14% of an $83 million UDAG
funding pool, which funded 38 other projects as well. (28)
Using HUD's 100-point system for allocating money to
competing applications for UDAG money, Columbia Point scored
only three points above the cut-off point which separated
the successful from the rejected applications. Yet the
award was the largest of the funding round. This indicates
that HUD was, despite its foot-dragging, ultimately committed
to seeing the project completed and that it was willing to
allocate relatively scarce resources to accomplish this goal.
The UDAG award is structured as a second mortgage.
It has a 40-year amortization period and a balloon payment
due at 30 years. The interest rate is 0% from 1989 through
1992, 5% from 1993 through 1998, and 8% thereafter, until
its maturity in the year 2019. No payments are due until
1993, and then they are subordinated to the MHFA mortgage
and to the developer dividend allowed by MHFA. The UDAG
mortgage is not assumable, and must be paid off in full in
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the event of a refinancing, resyndication, or sale.
The UDAG agreement, which also specifies the terms
of the Urban Initiatives grant, provides for public
participation in the syndication, cash flow, and refinancing
or sale of the project. Twenty-five percent of the net
syndication proceeds (29) in excess of $27 million must be
used to reduce the UDAG principal in 1993. Twenty-five
percent of the "excess cash flow," (30) to the extent that
it is available, must be paid into the Trust Fund each year,
10% as "additional interest" and 15% as "contingent lease
payments." In the event of a refinancing or sale, 20% of
the net proceeds from the transaction must be used to pay
down the UDAG balance. (31)
HUD's Urban Initiatives award of $8.7 million has been
earmarked for Columbia Point since 1978. It was originally
awarded to help the BHA "turn the project around." This
money will pay for the demolition and much of the site work
required. The award is structured as a third mortgage.
It is amortized over 40 years with level payments at 3%
interest. Like the UDAG, interest is 0% until 1993 when
payments become due. The payments are subordinate to those
for the UDAG loan.
Unlike the UDAG, the Urban Intiatives loan is
assumable, meaning that it may remain in place in the event
of a resyndication, refinancing or sale. In addition both
the UDAG and Urban Initiatives are "soft" mortgages, meaning
that their payments may be deferred if there is insufficient
cash to make them.
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Both the UDAG and the Urban Initiatives awards are
commitments of federal money obtained at the tail end of the
federal government's direct involvement in housing production.
Because of the new priorities set by the Reagan Administration,
securing a similar amount of federal funding for a single
housing project would be very unlikely today. The survival of
these grants over the long planning period is due to HUD's
high level of commitment to redevelop Columbia Point.
If not for the existence of an institutional commitment for
its completion which could transcend changing administration
policies, these awards would not have weathered the long and
arduous planning period for Columbia Point.
The project was granted a Chapter 884 grant in the
amount of $3 million by EOCD. The 884 program was actually
created when CMJ was redeveloping King's Lynne, to subsidize
the redevelopment of failed public housing projects into
privately owned mixed-income communities. The grant was
made through the BHA to defray up front development costs.
The project's private financing will come from the
developer's up front equity contribution, and from syndication
proceeds. CMJ has already invested approximately $4
million in mortgageable items. (32) The gross proceeds from
the syndication are estimated at $37 million. Less a
syndicator's fee of about 12%, this leaves $32.5 million in
net proceeds, out of which the UDAG participation would be
$1.4 million, leaving $31.2 million to be applied to the
project. However, like most syndications, this amount will
not be available at once, but rather in six yearly
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installments. (33)
In exchange for their investment of $37 million, the
limited partners will receive 95% of the tax losses and 95%
of the cash distribution allowed by MHFA. They also expect
the return of their initial capital investment and 50% of
the distributable sales proceeds. (34)
The Harbor Point project managed to win specific
exemption from changes in the tax treatment of real estate
in the House tax reform bill. Lobbyists succeeded in
convincing state representatives drafting this important
piece of federal legislation that Harbor Point merited
special protection. The issue of tax reform has nonetheless
been a thorny one for Harbor Point. The project did not
receive equivalent consideration in the Senate tax reform
bill.
Because the Harbor Point syndication is structured to
provide most of its benefits through a tax shelter rather
than a cash return, even if the depreciation schedules which
create these shelters are preserved specifically for Harbor
Point, it is not clear whether changes in personal income
tax rates (which would alter the value of tax shelters to
investors) will allow the syndication to work. Without the
capital generated through the syndication, the entire project
will be placed in jeopardy.
The developer (Peninsula Partners) is entitled to
any residual development funds still in reserve accounts in
1993, provided that that amount does not to exceed $14
million. Any amount in excess of this would go into the
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public trust. This "anti-windfall" provision is in the UDAG
agreement.
Because of cash requirements at closing, and because
phased-in occupancy will provide only a fraction of the
project's income in the first several years, the developer
must take out a gap loan to cover closing requirements
and operating deficits. This loan will be on the order
of $10 million. (35)
In addition to development subsidies, both the state
and federal governments are subsidizing Harbor Point's
operation. These subsidies will enable the project to
provide the mandated 400 units of low-income housing, as
well as insure that the project as a whole is financially
feasible.
The project has a 30-year Section 8 annual contributions
contract for $3.3 million per year to subsidize 350 of the 400
low-income units. This subsidy will make up the difference
between the HUD-determined "fair market rent" for a newly
constructed unit in Boston, and the rent which each tenant will
actually pay (30% of household income).
The award of the Section 8 to Harbor Point was a
feat in itself, considering that HUD no longer issues new
construction or substantial rehabilitation certificates.
It was accomplished by persuading HUD to allow the BHA to
transfer existing Section 8 certificates committed to other
projects to Harbor Point by replacing them with unused HUD
allocations. The amount exchanged, $27.8 million, is
equivalent to the capitalized value of the Section 8
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payments stream for 350 units over 30 years. This amount
was then used to subsidize the units whose certificates were
transferred to Harbor Point.
The transfer could be accomplished only by defeasing
the bonds for the existing certificates so that these
certificates could be legally applied to Harbor Point.
The defeasement required the approval of a bill in the
Massachusetts legislature.
The original certificates had a 40-year term; if the
FHA had insured the MHFA mortgage alone, it would have done
so for only 20 years, and this would have been the limit for
the Section 8 commitment as well. MHFA's coinsurance of the
mortgage allowed a compromise of 30 years for the transferred
Section 8 certificates.
While only a procedural necessity, the defeasance of
the bonds and the transfer of the Section 8 certificates is
one of several examples of legislative action, on the state
as well as the local level, which was required to make
Columbia Point's redevelopment feasible. (36)
EOCD committed 50 Chapter 707 certificates to Harbor
Point. Chapter 707 is a state rental assistance program
which parallels the terminated federal Section 8 program.
It works on the same principle of subsidizing the difference
between a fixed percentage of the tenant's income and an
EOCD-determined fair market rent. The Chapter 707 funding
is appropriated annually by the state legislature.
The commitment to Harbor Point will probably last at least
as long as the Section 8, or 30 years.
41
EOCD further subsidized Harbor Point with a 15-year
SHARP award. SHARP is a shallow-subsidy program which is
designed to provide developers the difference between cost-
based rents and rents attainable in the marketplace. EOCD
provides an annual contribution which is phased out over 15
years as the project's rents increase with the market.
By a special appropiation of the legislature, the
Harbor Point project was awarded a $2.5 million SHARP
subsidy. The regular appropriation of SHARP subsidies
for the entire state totalled $11.4 million in 1985. (37)
Thus the special Harbor Point award amounted to over one-
fifth of the entire SHARP program. This underscores the
strength of Massachusetts' commitment to Columbia Point.
Ironically, this award jeopardized the UDAG award.
Originally the SHARP subsidy was to permit a middle
band of moderate-income units in Harbor Point. Because it
was appropriated after the UDAG deadline, however, the UDAG
application to HUD did not mention this moderate-income
component. When HUD heard of the Commonwealth's intention
to subsidize these moderate-income units, it threatened to
rescind the UDAG award. The UDAG program was intended to
provide assistance to projects which would not occur "but for"
the UDAG award. HUD saw the SHARP commitment as a change in
the project's finances which would necessitate a re-evaluation
of the need for the UDAG award. This illustrates that while
Harbor Point benefited from commitment at all levels of
government, orchestrating this support was a challenging task.
The issue was settled when HUD was convinced by CMJ
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that the SHARP subsidy was required not to subsidize moderate-
income units, but rather to ensure overall project feasibility.
This was the result of the unexpectedly high subcontractor's
estimates which also necessitated the removal of the stepped
11- and 15-story buildings, and, as a result, a reduction in
the number of total units from 1402 to 1282.
The SHARP subsidy is structured as an interest-only
loan disbursed over 15 years, and payable over 15 additional
years at an annual interest rate of, 5% with no compounding.
Although it is repaid to EOCD, the SHARP statute allows the
repayments to be reycled into the project if it will benefit
low- and moderate-income tenants.
The 99-year groundlease with the BHA incorporates
the UDAG provisions, and further stipulates that the 25%
participation in cash flow and 20% participation in residuals
continue throughout the term of the lease. It also specifies
that 400 units of the development must be used as low-income
housing (38) as long as the lease is in effect.
The last element of the financial structure is unique
to Harbor Point. The ground lease from the BHA establishes
a trust, called the "Harbor Point Public Benefit Fund," to
be funded out of all the subsidy repayment, participation,
and contingent payment provisions detailed in the UDAG
agreement and the groundlease. The fund is to be divided
into two trust estates: the "Boston Housing Authority Fund,"
intended to "preserve, upgrade and expand the supply of
public low-income housing in the City of Boston," and the
"Harbor Point Apartments Low-Income Tenants Fund," intended
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to "maximize the goal of ensuring the the continual existence
of 400 low-income units at the Development in the event such
initial subsidy commitments are not so renewed or replaced."
The fund will be administered by three impartial
trustees appointed by the BHA and the Harbor Point Apartments
Company. Each year, beginning in the seventh year after the
project's completion (1996), the principal and interest in
the fund will be released in equal portions to each of the
two trust estates.
There is a provision for a legal determination to
prevent the release of the BHA's portion of the fund in the
event that the renewal or replacement of public subsidies
available is insufficient to fund the project's 400 low-
income units. In this case the low-income tenants fund
may claim the entire amount if necessary.
The financial package that was created to develop
and sustain Harbor Point could not have been accomplished
without a political imperative to complete the project.
The process by which the development was conceived and the
financing secured was marked by high visibility, the
involvement of many actors, and by a high degree of
cooperation across public-private and governmental lines.
As this chapter has illustrated, the package is
distinguished by extreme complexity, a high level of public
subsidy for both low-income and market-rate housing, full
utilization of Massachusetts' commitment to housing, and
and a high degree of federal involvement despite waning
federal committment to low-income housing.
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CHAPTER FIVE ANALYSIS
The complex financial structure which makes the
redevelopment of Columbia Point possible would not exist
without a political imperative to carry out the project.
Each time the project was threatened with infeasibility,
it secured additional commitments and concessions which kept
it feasible. Thus the complex financial structure which
holds the entire project together was also constructed
incrementally.
This chapter examines the level and form of public
subsidy pledged to Harbor Point, and attempts to provide a
single, unified picture of the costs and benefits of the
redevelopment of Columbia Point, as it is conceived.
That subsidy, in all of its complexity, can be considered a
proxy for the level of public commitment to redevelop
Columbia Point. Understanding the nature of these subsidies
is critical to understanding how the public commitment to
Harbor Point was translated into operational terms.
The chapter also investigates a likely scenario for
the project's financial performance over time in an attempt
to gauge the long term benefits to the developer and to
assess the public utility of the trust mechanism specified
in the ground lease.
Public Subsidy of Harbor Point
The previous chapters have shown that the selection
of the Columbia Point Peninsula as the location for low-income
housing led to the payment of a premium for the 400 low-income
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units over and above what they might have cost to build and
operate elsewhere. Because the project's financial picture
changed over time, while the commitment to the 400 low-income
units remained steadfast, the public costs of these units
grew to extraordinary levels, and even the market-rate units
will require subsidies for the project to be feasible.
Because all subsidy repayments provided for in the
UDAG agreement with HUD and in the groundlease with the BHA
will go into the "Harbor Point Public Benefit Fund," and not
back to the subsidy-granting agencies, these loans are not
actually "paid back," from the public perspective. Instead,
these loans can be considered grants, and the public utility
of the "Public Benefit Fund," which the paybacks will help
generate, as one of the public benefits of Columbia Point's
redevelopment. The subsidies from which Harbor Point
benefits can be divided into three types: capital cost
write-downs, mortgage write-downs, and operating subsidies.
1. Capital Cost Write-downs
The capital subsidies to Harbor Point include the
provision of a prime piece of land ("one of the finest sites
for urban development in Boston, or the entire country for
that matter," according to HUD's assistant secretary in
1982) (39) at very favorable terms, $3 million in capital
from the state, and $20.7 million in capital from the federal
government. They also include the value of the income tax
foregone by the federal government through use of tax
shelter to attract the $37 million in private capital.
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The BHA site was enlarged through the annexation of
13 acres of public parkland to bring the total site area up
to 51 acres. Even with the demolition required to make the
site developable, the net result of the terms of the BHA
groundlease ($1 per year) for this parcel is still equivalent
to a substantial capital subsidy.
As long as the BHA is willing relinquish Columbia
Point, and to transfer the site to private hands, the
conveyance of the site under the terms of the Harbor Point
lease is in effect foregoing the sales price the BHA could
have obtained in the private market. Under normal conditions,
this site might have commanded a price on the order of $22
million (assuming that 15% of total project costs are
attributable to land, and a total project cost of $150
million). Alternatively, MHFA appraised the value of the
land to be $7 million ($10,000 per unit, minus a premium for
special site expenses). (40) If the average of these two
figures ($14.75 million) is accepted as the market value of
this site, then the BHA is providing a capital subsidy in
income forgone equivalent to $11,500 per unit, for each of
the 1282 units.
The contingent lease payments specified by the UDAG
agreement and the groundlease are dedicated to the Public
Benefit Fund. Thus for the purpose of this analysis, they
are not considered a cost of the lease, but are accounted
for in the evaluation of the Public Benefit Fund.
The Chapter 884 grant is an outright capital subsidy
from Massachusetts. As the purpose of Chapter 884 is to
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ensure the preservation of low-income units in redeveloped
projects, it is allocated here only to the 400 low-income
units, and represents a capital subsidy of $7,500 per low-
income unit.
The federal UDAG and Urban Initiatives awards help
defray hard costs. The UDAG is to be used for new
construction, while the Urban Initiatives will be applied to
the project's demolition, utilities, earthwork and unusual
foundation costs. (41) Applied to the entire project, these
awards provide capital equal to over $16,000 per unit.
In order to attract private capital to real estate
development, the federal government allows investors to
shelter income from taxation through the use of accelerated
depreciation and limited partnerships. The amount of paper
losses a project generates reduces the taxable income of
investors by an equal amount. Thus the federal government
forgoes the income taxes which would have been paid on this
income had it not been sheltered. In the Harbor Point
project, the syndication is structured to offer tax shelter
over 15 years. From a public perspective, the cost of this
tax shelter can be considered the present value of the tax
payments which the federal government will foregoe.
Discounted at 10%, the present value of these payments is
$47 million. (42) Divided over 1282 units, the public cost
of this arrangement is over $36,000 per unit. It should be
noted that because this is the result of federal tax policy,
this subsidy is not unique to Harbor Point.
2. Mortgage Write-Down
The MHFA mortgage commitment is in excess of
$94,000 per unit. The MHFA mortgage amount of $121 million
was raised by selling bonds whose yield is tax-exempt.
This mortgage is written down by the federal government
because the treasury forgoes the tax the investors would
otherwise have paid on their bond return. From a public
perspective, the cost of the MHFA loan made with tax-exempt
bonds is the amount of income tax thus foregone by the
federal government. If we assume that the buyers of the
MHFA bonds are on average in the 40% tax bracket, and the
prevailing taxable bond rate at the time of the bond issue
was 11%, then the amount of income tax foregone by the
federal government on the MHFA bonds is approximately $5.3
million, spread over 40 years. (43) If we account for the
time value of money, and discount at 10%, the present value
of this tax foregone by the federal goverment over the 40-
year term is $1.3 million, or about $1,000 per unit.
3. Operating Subsidies
As we saw in the previous chapter, the public sector
is also subsidizing the operation of the project. Every
unit in Harbor Point will receive about $2,000 per year in
operating subsidy from the SHARP allocation. EOCD will
phase out the SHARP award over 15 years, depending on how
well the project's rising rental income can supplant it.
This subsidy must be repaid by the developer, under the terms
described in the previous chapter. However, because of the
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wording of the SHARP legislation, it is assumed here that
only half the repayment will go back to EOCD, with the
remainder paid into the Public Benefit Fund. The public cost
of the SHARP award can therefore be considered the present
value of the payment stream. Discounting at 10%, this is
equal to $12.6 million. Divided over the project's 1282 units,
the SHARP commitment has a present value of $9800 per unit.
Each low-income unit in Columbia Point will receive
an additional $10,000 per year in operating subsidies. This
is the per-unit average of the total Section 8 and Chapter
707 contribution for 400 units per year. The Section 8
contract is for $3.3 million per year. If we assume that
the HUD fair market rent will inflate at 4% per year, the
present value of the Section 8 payment stream is $45 million,
or about $129,000 per unit, over 350 units. Assuming that
EOCD's fair market rents are on average 10% higher than
HUD's, (44) and inflating these payments at 4% per year as
well, the present value of the 707 award is $7 million, or
about $142,000 per unit, over 50 units.
The following tables summarize the public subsidies
to Harbor Point as discussed above in terms of type, source,
allocation, and magnitude. All subsidies are expressed in
terms of their present value discounted at 10%. Table 1
illustrates subsidies by type and source on a per-unit basis,
and Table 2 illustrates how the subsidy burden is
distributed among levels of government.
Table 1
Per-unit Public Subsidies by Type and Source
Capital Cost Write-downs
(per unit)
Federal:
State:
Local:
(Tax shelter)
(UDAG)
(Urban Initiatives)
(Chapter 884)
(BHA groundlease)
Low-income
$ 36,000
9,360
6,786
7,500
11,500
Market rate
$ 36,000
9,360
6,786
None
11,500
SUBTOTAL
Mortgage Write-downs:
(per unit)
$ 71,146
Low-income
$ 63,646
Market-rate
(MHFA mortgage)
State:
Local:
SUBTOTAL
$ 1,000
None
None
$ 1,000
Operating Subsidies:
(per unit)
Low-income Market-rate
Federal:
State:
(Sec. 8, 350 units)
(Ch. 707, 50 units)
(SHARP)
Local:
SUBTOTAL
TOTAL
$ 129,000
142,000
9,800 I
None
$ 140,425 (*)
$ 212,571
None
None
9,800
None
$ 9,800
$ 74,440
(*) Weighted average of Section 8
and Chapter 707 used in calculation.
Federal: $ 1,000
None
None
$ 1,000
Table 2
Per-unit Public Subsidies by Level of Government
Actual expenditure:
per low-income unit
per market unit
Income forgone:
per low-income unit
per market unit
Present value of
payment stream:
per low-income unit
per market unit
SUBTOTALS
per low-income unit
per market unit
TOTALS
per low-income unit
per market unit
Local
0
0
11, 500
11,500
( *) 0
0
$ 11,500
$ 11,500
$ 212,571
$ 74,446
These tables reveal that the federal government is
most heavily subsidizing Harbor Point in both actual
expenditure and income forgone. They also illustrate that
in the course of ensuring the feasibility of Harbor Point,
market rate as well as low-income units had to be subsidized.
Financial Performance
Another way of evaluating the ramifications of Harbor
Point's financial structure is to look at the financial
performance of the project over time.
One of the unique aspects of Harbor Point is the
Public Benefit Trust Fund. This mechanism will collect the
(*) Weighted average of Section 8
and Chapter 707 used in calculation.
State
7,500
0
0
0
27,550
9,800
35,050
9,800
Federal
16,146
16,146
37,000
37,000
112,875
0
166,021
53,146
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paybacks of public subsidies, to provide some security to
Harbor Point's 400 low-income units once the initial 30-year
commitment expires. The results of financial projections
show that the amount this fund will generate is highly
sensitive to the project's overall success as a residential
community. Appendix D shows financial projections for the
project using the Case I assumptions, listed in Appendix C.
In this "best" case, in which rents rise steadily and vacancy
remains low, the balance of the Harbor Point Low-Income
Tenants' Fund after 30 years is almost $140 million, not
including the 20% participation in the sale or refinancing
of the project which would most likely be occuring around
this time. This amount could subsidize Harbor Point's 400
low-income units for 8 to 12 years, depending on the "fair
market rents" allocated to these units. The 20% participation
in the proceeds of a sale or refinancing, which would also
be paid into the Fund, might provide up to another 5 years
of subsidy, depending on the project's sale price.
Under these assumptions, the project also generates
"excess cash" in amounts sufficient to subsidize the moderate-
income component which was deleted in the project's initial
stages. If the project performs as well as Case I, it would
be relatively easy to self-subsidize the moderate-income
component through rent-skewing. However there is no formal
agreement to this effect. In addition, the BHA will receive
an income stream from its portion of the Trust Fund. While
the BHA's specific use of these payments is not explained
more specifically than to "preserve, upgrade and expand the
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supply of low-income housing in the City of Boston," their
value under these assumptions can be expressed as being
sufficient to develop roughly ten units of housing per year,
for the first 30 years of Harbor Point's operation. (45)
Under the assumptions listed as Case II in Appendix C,
in which rents rise about half as quickly and vacancy rates
remain about twice as high, the Trust Fund accumulates very
little at all, scarcely enough to subsidize the 400 units
for two to three years only. Payback of public subsidies
which are junior to the MHFA allowed dividend are deferred,
and there is no "excess cash flow" in which the Trust Fund
can participate. In this case refinancing would be difficult
because the property's value would not have increased
significantly, and also because the cash flow would be
insufficient to accommodate any significant additional debt
service.
The return to the developer is also tied very closely
to the project's overall success. Because the development
itself is so expensive, it is very unlikely that the developer
will be able to claim a large amount of unused development
funds. While CMJ is relatively sure to recover its up front
$4 million equity quickly from operations if not from the
syndication payments, the chances of extraordinary profits
from the actual construction appear slim. Under the Case I
assumptions, CMJ could refinance around year 2002, and
realize a before-tax gain of $20 million (see Appendix E).
The after-tax gain, discounted at the appropriate rate, is
hardly a wind-fall in present value. However if the
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project performs well, its value will appreciate enough to
warrant a high sale price, which will allow CMJ to extract
a sizeable gain at the time of sale. Again the present
value of this gain after taxes is unlikely to be
extraordinary, and is further subject to considerable risk.
Under the Case II assumptions, the developer would
earn very little return other than the MHFA allowed cash
dividend. This is because under these assumptions, the
project would be unable to sustain additional financing, and
experience little growth in value which would allow such a
refinancing. In Harbor Point, the developer's profit is
subject to substantial risk because it is directly tied to
the project's appreciation, which itself is uncertain.
Both the amount of money generated by the Trust Fund
and the returns to the developer are highly dependent on
Harbor Point's success as a residential community. Because
the developer's return comes almost exclusively from the
appreciation of the property, CMJ has great incentive to see
that it is properly maintained and operated, and that it can
attract the market-rate tenants it needs to sustain itself.
The two sets of assumptions used above are both
extremes. The project's actual performance most likely will
lie somewhere in between: the Trust Fund will accumulate
reserves sufficient to carry the 400 low-income units for
perhaps three to eight years, and CMJ will earn a return,
but under that for an ordinary housing project.
In exchange for the costs described in the beginning
of this chapter, Harbor Point will provide several public
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benefits. The most intangible benefit is the elimination of
the stigma and blight on the Columbia Point Peninsula.
Harbor Point's success might spur additional investment in
the area. Most tangibly, Harbor Point will pay approximately
$1 million per year in property taxes to the City of Boston.
Third, it will provide 400 of the most desirable low-income
housing units in the Boston, subsidized for 30 years.
Lastly it may (depending upon its ability to attract and
retain market-rate tenants) generate substantial amounts of
resources to extend the subsidy commitment to its own low-
income component, as well as to be used by the BHA in other
developments.
CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSIONS
The development of Harbor Point defied normal
development practice. The concept of what could be done
with the site was politically determined and never
evaluated from a practical standpoint either publicly or
privately. Evaluations of alternative re-uses of the site,
or of the actual costs of the redevelopment were not carried
out. Harbor Point's development concept was conceived
independently of the financing available. The complex
financing package which was manuevered into place is a
reflection of the political imperative to redevelop Columbia
Point. The project exacted increasing costs from the public
and private participants. Yet both the public and private
sectors actors remained committed to the project. From the
start of the development negotiations, through the securing
of all the financing the project required, so many actors
had their hands on the project, their involvement was so
promise-laden, and the publicity of those promises so great,
that everyone was forced to push through, and then shore up,
a project which gradually made less and less sense from
either a public or a private perspective. The project
lurched forward propelled only by the degree of commitment,
both public and private, it had garnered as a political
imperative.
As the financial analysis has shown, the amount of
subsidy required to redevelop Columbia Point is substantial.
The public paid a premium to redevelop low-income housing on
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this site. The imposition of the publicly negotiated
development concept necessitated the subsidization of the
market-rate as well as the low-income units in the project.
If Harbor Point succeeds as a residential community, however,
the public sector will participate in a significant way in
the project's profits, for the entire 99-year lease term.
If the project is unable to attract affluent tenants willing
to pay market rents, and the project's income cannot
increase over time, neither the developer nor the public
sector will realize very substantial benefits from this
effort. The risk to both the public and private sectors is
clear and substantial.
Publicly as well as privately, the success of this
development hinges on its ability to obliterate the
stigmatized image of Columbia Point and attract enough
market-rate tenants to keep the project's income, and value,
rising. To do this Harbor Point must overcome the lingering
effects of Columbia Point's reputation and its unusual
tenant profile.
The polarization of the tenant profile is a
peculiarity of Harbor Point and a by-product of the
political imperative to carry out the redevelopment.
The low-income units are needed politically, and are central
to the redevelopment concept. The market-rate units are
required for the bulk of the project's income, and to help
redefine the Peninsula's character. However, the presence
of low-income households may deter market-rate tenants from
choosing to live there. This is the crux of Harbor Point's
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operating risk. There is some control over this factor,
however. While all the existing public housing tenants have
rehousing guaranties, entitling them to new units from which
they cannot be evicted without good cause, the Harbor Point
Apartments Company may select the balance of the low-income
tenants, and those required to replace vacancies, as long as
they meet the income requirements specified in the lease. (46)
The freedom the groundlease gives to the Harbor Point
Apartments Company over tenant choice will give management a
fair degree of control over the tenant make-up, which will
in turn help in establishing Harbor Point as a community in
which market-rate tenants will choose to live.
One of the motivations for evaluating "what the public
is getting for its money" in Columbia Point is that the way
in which this project attracted public dollars was unique.
Because the presence of the Columbia Point public housing
project, the public sector was wedded to the site.
The commitment to house Columbia Point's low-income tenants
was inextrably tied to their tenure on the Peninsula.
It would have been politically infeasible to build 400 units
of low-income housing elsewhere in the City, uproot the
tenants, and turn over the Columbia Point site to the
private sector to build whatever it wished. Yet today this
solution does not seem so far-fetched from a strict cost-
benefit point of view. Equivalent units could surely have
been built elsewhere more inexpensively, and consequently in
greater numbers for the same amount of public subsidy.
The site could have been sold or leased for a significant
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amount of money, and paid higher property taxes. Yet one
must remember that while the redevelopment was constrained
by the effects of Columbia Point's past, it was this past
which generated the political imperative which allowed this
redevelopment to occur at all.
Although it was shown that the Public Trust mechanism
could, under the best conditions, carry the low-income
component for up to 15 years after the initial 30-year
subsidy commitment expires, the lease calls for the units to
remain low-income for the entire 99-year term. Clearly the
public commitments made to subsidize the low-income units
will have to be renewed or replaced. The interval during
which the Trust mechanism could conceivably carry these units
is very short compared to the entire leasehold period.
How this problem is resolved remains to be seen, but it will
probably involve continued negotiation between the public
and private actors.
Columbia Point, as a housing development, is truly
an anomaly. The way its redevelopment was engineered was
costly to both the public and private sectors. Both will
benefit if the project proves to be a success. There is,
however, a significant element of risk inherent in the
project which cannot be mitigated without destroying the
original development concept. The participation of both the
private and public sectors in such a tortuous process, to
complete a project of such complexity with such uncertain
benefits can only be explained by a factor outside the
ordinary calculus of the development process--a political
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imperative of the highest order.
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APPENDIX A
Construction Phasing Schedule
PHASE COMPLETION
BY (MO)
18
24
30
36
44
MARKET
UNITS
208
214
256
158
46
882
SUBS IDI ZED
UNITS
134
67
97
78
24
400
Source: Corcoran, Mullins and Jennison Relocation Plan
TOTAL
UNITS
342
281
353
236
70
1282
APPENDIX B
Breakdown of Total Development Costs
Harbor Point
Construction:
Main Buildings
Accessory Buildings
Land Improvements
General Requirements
Fees:
Builder's Overhead
Bond Premium
Architect's Fee
Other Fees
Financing and Carrying Costs:
Construction Loan Interest
Taxes & Insurance
FHA Mortgage Insurance Premium
MHFA Financing Fee
Other Fees
Title
Legal, Organization and Audit Fees:
Relocation Costs:
Other:
Builder and Sponsor Profit and Risk:
Total Estimated Development Cost:
Per unit:
$ 83,927,302
3,914,380
19,807,852
5,110,440
2,112,201
650,000
3,935,200
1,694,075
20,870,062
700,000
3,026,840
1,210,736
2,860,257
425,000
105,000
1,106,000
35,000
15,034,934
$ 166,525,279
$ 129,895
Source: FHA Rental Housing Project Income Analysis and
Appraisal. January, 1986
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APPENDIX C
Operating Assumptions
For Both Cases:
1. Management fee of 5% of gross income less SHARP.
2. MHFA allowed dividend of $2,212,000 per year starting
in 1989.
3. Real estate tax in 1990 of $700/unit.
4. MHFA allows developer to "catch up" on allowable
dividend before paying subsidy paybacks.
5. Limited partners bought out for original investment plus
50% residual participation.
6. Trust Fund earns 9% interest per year.
7. Gross syndication proceeds of $37 million, UDAG paydown
of $1.4 million in 1993.
Case I Assumptions:
1. Refinancing in year
2. Sale in year 2017
Inflation:
Market rents
Subsidized rents
Commercial rents
Operating expenses
Property tax
Other expenses
Vacancy rates:
Market units
Subsidized units
Commercial
Case II Assumptions:
Inflation:
Market rents
Subsidized rents
Commercial rents
Operating expenses
Property tax
Other expenses
Vacancy rates:
Market units
Subsidized units
Commercial
2002
Thru 1991 Thru 2005 2006 on
--------- --------- ---------
0%
4%
4%
6%
2%
4%
1989
50%
5%
5%
8%
4%
6%
6%
2%
4%
1990 1991 to 2002
10%
3%
4%
Thru 1991
0%
3%
0%
7%
4%
6%
1989
50%
7%
20%
4%
3%
4%
4%
3%
4%
Thru 2005
4%
2%
2%
7%
4%
6%
5%
4%
6%
6%
2%
4%
2002 on
4%
3%
4%
2006 on
3%
2%
2%
7%
4%
6%
1990 1991 to 2002 2003 on
---- ---- ------- -------
35% 15%
5% 5%
10% 10%
8%
4%
10%
8%
4%
10%
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APPENDIX D
HARBOR POINT FINANCIAL PROJECTION USING CASE I ASSUMPTIONS
CALENDAR YEAR 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
PROJECT YEAR 1 2 3
ACTIVITY CONST/LEASE CONST/LEASE CONST/LEASE CONST/LEASE LEASE/OPER OPER
MARKET RATE UNITS 14,274,636 14,274,636 14,274,636
SECTION 8 UNITS 3,519,612 3,660,396 3,806,812
CHAPTER 707 UNITS 694,836 722,629 751,535
SHARP SUBSIDY 6,000 500,000 1,900,000 2,400,000 2,500,000 2,500,000
COMMERCIAL SPACE 385,200 400,608 416,632
OTHER 69,840 72,634 75,539
TOTAL GROSS INCOME 40,000 3,670,000 14,770,000 21,344,124 21,630,904 21,825,154
VACANCY (7,381,268) (1,582,242) (728,178)
TOTAL NET INCOME 24,000 2,200,000 8,500,000 13,962,856 20,048,661 21,096,976
OPERATING EXPENSES (8,000) (700,000) (2,800,000) (3,558574) (3,772,088) (3,998,414)
MANAGEMENT FEE (,200) (85,000) (330,000) (578,143) (877,433) (929,849)
RENTUP, MARKETING (100,000) (525,000) (735,000) (735,000) 0 0
MISC. EXP DURING CONST. (235,000) (235,000) (235,000) 0 0
SOCIAL SERVICES (93,333) (86,666) (90,133)
TENANT GROUP EXPENSES (200,000) (200,000) (250,000)
INVESTOR SERVICE FEE (25,000) (25,000) t25,000) (26,000) (27,040) (28,122)
REPLACEMENT RESERVE (161,431) (484,294) (484,294) (484,294)
PROPERTY TAX (897,400) (910,861)
TOTAL EXPENSES (134,200) (1,570,000) (4,286,431) (5,900,344) (6,344,922) (69691,9673)
NET OPERATING INCOME (110,200) 630,000 4,213,569 87062,511 13,703,739 14,405,304
MHFA DEBT SERVICE (4,243,539) (12,730,616) (12,73066)
REFINANCE MIS. DEBT SERVICE
UDAG REPAYMENT
URBAN INITIATIVES REPAYMENT
SHARP REPAYMENT
GAP LOAN INTEREST (1,700,000) (1,700,000) (750,000) (800,000)
CASH FLOW (1,810,200) (1,070,000) 3,463,569 3,018973 973,123 1,674,688
MHFA ALLOWED DISTRIBUTION 3,463,569 3,018,973 973,123 1,674,688
PEXCESS A HX 1,252,569 07,973 0 0
'EXCESS CASH* AVAILABLE 0 0 0 0
CASH TO LIITEDS 0 0 700,9000 924467 1,590,953
CASH TO CN (1,810,200) (1,070,000) 3,463,569 2,5318973 48,656 83,734
UDAG PARTICIPATION
GROUNDLEASE PARTICIPATION
TRUST PAYMENT
TOTAL TRUST BALANCE
BHA FUND ALLOCATION
LOW-INCOME TENANTS FUND ALLOCATION
LOW-INCOME TENANTS FUND BALANCE
UNUSED EXCESS CASH' 0 0 0 0
SHARP REPAYMENT TO EOCD
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APPENDIX D
(CON'T)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
OPER OPER OPER OPER OPER OPER OPER OPER OPER
15,416,607 16,649,935 17,981,930 19,420,485 20,974,123 22,652,053 24,464,218 26,421,355 2855,6
3,959,085 4,117,448 4,282,146 4,453,432 4,631,569 4,816,832 5,009,505 5,209,886 5,418,281
781,596 812,860 845,374 879,189 914,357 950,931 988,968 1,029,527 1,069,668
2,500,000 2,500,000 2,500,000 2,500,000 2,500,000 2,236,806 415,306 36,014 0
433,298 450,630 468,655 487,401 506,897 527,173 548,260 570,190 592,998
78,561 81,703 84,971 88,370 91,905 95,581 99,404 103,380 107,515
23,169,146 24,612,576 26,163,076 27,828,877 29,618,851 31,279,376 31,525,661 33,369,352 35,723,526
(780,145) (836,017) (896,098) 1960,713) (1,030,214) (1,104,981) (1,185,424) (1,271,983) (1,365,137)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
22,389,001 23,776,559 25,266,979 26,868,164 28,588,637 30,174,395 30,340,238 32,097,369 34,358,389
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(4,238,319) (4,492,618) (4,762,175) (5047,905) (5,350,780) (59,671,826) (6,012,136) (6,3729,864) 6,755,236)
(994,450) (1,063,828) (1,138,349) (1,218,408) (1,304,432) (1,396,879) (1,496,247) (1,603,068) (1,717,919)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(93,738) (97,488) (101,387) (105,443) (109,661) (114,047) (118,609) (123,9353) (128,287)
(3009,000) (350,9000) (400,000) (440, ) (440,000) (440,9000) (440,000) (440,000) (440,000)
(29,246) (30,416) (31,633) (32,898) (34,214) (35,583) (37,006) (38,486) (40,026)
(484,294) (484,294) (484,294) (484,294) (484,294) (484,294) (484,294) (484,294) (484,294)
(924,524) (938,392) (952,468) (966,755) (981,256) (995,975) (1,010,914) (1,026,078) (1,041,469)
(704,572) (7,457,036) (71870,306) (81295,704) (87049,637) (138,605) (9,599,206)(10,088,144)(10,607,232)
------- ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
--
15,324,429 16,319,523 17,396,673 18,572,460 19,884,001 21,035,790 20,741,031 22,009,225 23,751,157
---------------------------------------------------- 7---------------------------------
(12,730616)(129730,616)(12,730,616)(12,730,616)(12,730,616)(12,730,616) (12,730616) (12,730,616)(12,730,616)
((613,933) (61, 933) (613,933) (613,933) (613,933) (613,933) (885,276) (885,276)
(373,736) (373,736) (37,736) (3739,736) (373,9736) (373,736) (373,736) (373,736)
(1,249,706)
------------------------ ---------------------------------------------- ------------ 
--
2,593,813 2,60,238 3,678,388 4,854,175 6,165,716 79,317,505 7,022,746 8019,597 8,511,822
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
------
2,593,813 2,216,034 2212,9000 2,212,000 2,212,000 221,090 2,212,000 2,212,000 2,212,000
381,813 389,238 1466,388 2,642,175 3,7953,716 5,105,505 4,810,746 51807,597 6299,7822
0 385,204 1,466,388 2,642,175 3,953,716 5,105,505 4,810,746 5807,597 6,1299,822
2,464,123 2,105,232 2,101,400 2,101,400 2,101,400 2,101,400 2,101,400 2,101,400 2,101,400
129,691 110,802 110,600 110,600 110,600 110,600 110,600 110,600 110,600
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- 
--
1,496,301 366,597 660,544 988,429 1,276,376 1,202,687 1,451,899 1,574,956
2,483,970 1,354,266 1,648,213 1,976,098 2,264,045 2,190,356 2,710,911 3,458,821
2,483,970 3,838,236 5,486,449 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 3,731,273 1,132,023 1,095,178 1,355,456 1,729,410
0 0 0 3,731,273 1,132,023 1,095,178 1,355,456 1,729,410
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0 0 0 3,731,273 5,199,111 6,762,208 8,726,263 11,241,037
0 288,903 1,099,791 1,981,632 2,965,287 3,829,129 3,608,060 4,355,698 4,724,867
624,853
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CON'T
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
OPER REFINANCE OPER OPER OPER OPER OPER OPER OPER
30,817,868 33,283,298 35,945,962 38,821,639 41,927,370 44,023,738 46,224,925 48,536,172 50,962,980
5,635,012 5,860,413 6,094,829 6,338,622 6,592,167 6,855,854 7,130,088 7,415,292 7,711,903
1,112,455 1,156,953 1,203,231 1,251,360 1,301,415 1,353,471 1,407,610 1,463,915 1,522,471
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
616,718 641,386 667,042 693,723 721,472 750,331 780,345 811,558 844,021
111,816 116,289 120,940 125,778 130,809 136,041 141,483 147,142 153,028
38,293,869 41,058,339 44,032,004 47,231,123 50,673,233 53,119,436 55,684,451 58,374,078 61,194,403
(1,465,398) (1,573,323) (1,689,509) (1,814,603) (1,949,302) (2,044,045) (2,143,416) (2,247,642) (2,356,963)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
36,828,471 39,485,016 42,342,495 45,416,520 48,723,932 51,075,392 53,541,035 56,126,436 58,837,441
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(7,160,550) (7,590,183) (8,045,594) (8,528,330) (9,040,029) (9,582,431)(10,157,377)(10,766,820)(11,412,829)
(1,841,424) (1,974,251) (2,117,125) (2,270,826) (2,436,197) (2,553,770) (2,677,052) (2,806,322) (2,941,872)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(133,419) (138,756) (144,306) (150,078) (156,081) (162,324) (168,817) (175,570) (182,593)
(440,000) (440,000) (440,000) (440,000) (440,000) (440,000) (440,000) (440,000) (440,000)
(41,627) (43,292) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(484,294) (484,294) (484,294) (484,294) (484,294) (484,294) (484,294) (484,294) (484,294)
(1,057,091) (1,072,948) (1,089,042) (1,105,378) (1,121,958) (1,138,788) (1,155,869) (1,173,207) (1,190,806)
(11,158,405) (11,743,723) (12,320,361) (12,978,906) (13,678,560) (14,361,607) (15,083,410) (15,846,213) (16,652,394)
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
----- - --
25,670,066 27,741,292 30,022,134 32,437,614 35,045,372 36,713,784 38,457,625 40,280,222 42,185,047
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
---
(12,730,616) (12,730,616) (12,730,616) (12, 730, 616) (12, 730, 616) (12,9730,616) (12,730, 616) (12,730,616) (12,730,616)
(11,980,559)(11,980,559)(11,980,559)(11,980,559)(11,980,559)(11,980,559)(11,980,559)(11,980,559)
(885,276) (885,276) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(373,736) (373,736) (373,736) (373,736) (373,736) (373,736) (373,736) (373,736) (373,736)
(1,249,706) (1,249,706) (1,249,706) (1,249,706) (1,249,706) (1,249,706) (1,249,706) (1,249,706) (1,249,706)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
-
10,430,732 521,399 3,687,517 6,102,997 8,710,755 10,379,167 12,123,008 13,945,605 15,850,430
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
------
2,212,000 521,399 2,212,000 2,212,000 2,212,000 2,212,000 2,212,000 2,212,000 2,212,000
8,218,732 0 1,475,517 3,890,997 6,498,755 8,167,167 9,911,008 11,733,605 13,638,430
8,218,732 0 1,475,517 3,890,997 6,498,755 8,167,167 9,911,008 11,733,605 13,638,430
2,101,400 495,329 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
110,600 26,070 2,212,000 2,212,000 2,212,000 2,212,000 2,212,000 2,212,000 2,212,000
------------------------------------------------- 
- -------------------------
2,054,683 5,073,790 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
368,879 972,749 1,624,689 2,041,792 2,477,752 2,933,401 3,409,607
3,938,548 6,957,655 1,367,468 1,971,338 2,623,278 3,040,381 3,476,341 3,931,990 4,408,197
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1,969,274 3,478,828 683,734 985,669 1,311,639 1,520,190 1,738,171 1,965,995 2,204,098
1,969,274 3,478,828 683,734 985,669 1,311,639 1,520,190 1,738,171 1,965,995 2,204,098
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
14,222,004
6,164,049
624,853
18,980,812
0
624,853
21,372,819
1,106,638
624,853
24,282,042
2,918,248
624,853
27,779,065
4,874,066
624,853
31,799,371
6,125,375
624,853
36,399,485
7,433,256
624,853
41,641,434
8,800,204
624,853
47,593,262
10,228,822
624,853
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APPENDIX D
(CON'T)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
OPER OPER OPER OPER OPER OPER OPER SALE
53,511,129 56,186,686 58,996,020 61,945,821 65,043,112 68,295,267 71,710,031 75,295,532
8,020,379 8,341,195 8,674,842 9,021,836 9,382,710 9,758,018 10,148,339 10,554,272
1,583,370 1,646,705 1,712,573 1,781,076 1,852,319 1,926,412 2,003,468 2,083,607
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
877,781 912,893 949,408 987,385 1,026,880 1,067,955 1,110,674 1,155,101
159,149 165,515 172,136 179,021 186,182 193,629 201,374 209,429
64,151,809 67,252,993 70,504,979 73,915,139 77,491,203 81,241,282 85,173,886 89,297,942
(2,471,626) (2,591,896) (2,718,046) (2,850,367) (2,989,160) (3,134,743) (3,287,451) (3,447,633)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
61,680,183 64,661,097 67,786,933 71,064,772 74,502,043 78,106,539 81,886,435 85,850,308
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(12,097,599) (12,823, 455) (13,592,862) (14,408,434) (15,272,940) (16,189,316) (17,160,675) (18,190,315)
(3,084,009) (3,233,055) (3,389,347) (3,553,239) (3,725,102) (3,905,327) (4,094,322) (4,292,515)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(189,897) (197,492) (205,392) (213,608) (222,152) (231,038) (240,280) (249,891)
(440,000) (440,000) (440,000) (440,000) (440,000) (440,000) (440,000) (440,000)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(484,294) (484,294) (484,294) (484,294) (484,294) (484,294) (484,294) (484,294)
(1,208,668) (1,226,798) (1,245,200) (1,263,878) (1,282,836) (1,302,078) (1,321,610) (1,341,434)
(17,504,466) (18,405,094) (19,357,095) (20,363,452) (21,427,324) (22,552,054) (23,741,180) (24,998,450)
-- ---------- ------- 
- --------------------- - - ----------------
44,175,716 46,256,003 48,429,838 50,701,320 53,074,719 55,554,485 58,145,254 60,851,859
-------------------------------------------------------------------
(12,730,616) (12,730,616) (12,730,616) (12,730,616) (12,730,616) (12,730,616) (12,730,616) (12,730,616)
(11,980,559) (11,980,559) (11,980,559) (11,980,559) (11,980,559) (11,980,559) (11,980,559) (11,980,559)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(373,736) (373,736) (373,736) (373,736) (373,736) (373,736) (373,736) (373,736)
(1,249,706) (1,249,706)(10,399,706)(10,399,706)(10,399,706)(10,399,706) 0 0
-------------------------- -----------------------------------------
17,841,099 19,921,386 12,945,221 15,216,703 17,590,102 20,069,867 33,060,343 35,766,948
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2,212,000 2,212,000 2,212,000 2,212,000 2,212,000 2,212,000 2,212,000 2,212,000
15,629,099 17,709,386 10,733,221 13,004,703 15,378,102 17,857,867 30,848,343 33,554,948
15,629,099 17,709,386 10,733,221 13,004,703 15,378,102 17,857,867 30,848,343 33,554,948
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2,212,000 2,212,000 2,212,000 2,212,000 2,212,000 2,212,000 2,212,000 2,212,000
------------------------------------------------- 
--------------------
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3,907,275 4,427,346 2,683,305 3,251,176 3,844,525 4,464,467 7,712,086 8,388,737
4,905,864 5,425,936 8,256,894 8,824,765 9,418,115 10,038,056 8,085,822 8,762,473
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2,452,932 2,712,968 4,128,447 4,412,382 4,709,057 5,019,028 4,042,911 4,381,236
2,452,932 2,712,968 4,128,447 4,412,382 4,709,057 5,019,028 4,042,911 4,381,236
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
54,329,587
11,721,824
624,853
61,932,218
13,282,039
624,853
71,634,564
8,049,916
5,199,853
82,494,058
9,753,527
5,199,853
94,627,580
11,533,576
5,199,853
108,163,090
13,393,401
5,199,853
121,940,679 137,296,577
23,136,258 25,166,211
APPENDIX E
REFINANCING SCENARIO--2002
Calculation of Cash Due Limited Partners:
NOI $
Sale Price
Less: Selling Expense
MHFA Balance
UDAG Balance
SHARP Balance
Net Proceeds
Less: Original Capital
Distributable Proceeds
Less: UDAG Participation
CMJ Share:
LIMITEDS SHARE:
27,741,292
277,400,000
2,774,000
115,330,000
9,904,000
36,526,000
105,328,000
37,000,000
68,328,000
13,665,600
54,462,400
27,331,200
27,331,200
Refinancing Proceeds Calculation:
Assume private second mortgage of $100 million at 11%
for 20 years.
Mortgage Proceeds
Less: UDAG Balance
Limiteds Capital
Limiteds Share
Net Proceeds from
refinancing
Less: UDAG Participation
Refinancing Proceeds to
CMJ:
100,000,000
9,904,000
37,000,000
27,331,200
25,764,800
5,152,960
20,611,840
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List of Interviews
1. Bailey, Martha. Boston Redevelopment Authority.
2 April 1986.
2. Chiolsi, Deborah. Tucker, Anthony and Day, Inc.
Boston, Massachusetts. 9 April 1986.
3. Howarth, Karen. Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency.
Boston, Massachusetts. 1, 9 April 1986.
4. Jones, Marty. Corcoran, Mullins and Jennison, Inc.
Quincy, Massachusetts. 2, 18 April 1986.
5. Kuehn, Jr., Robert. Housing Associates, Inc.
Cambridge, Massachusetts. 21 April 1986.
6. Regan, Charleen. Boston Redevelopment Authority.
2 April 1986.
7. Solomon, Rod. Boston Housing Authority.
10 April 1986.
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